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Powerful Qualities, Zombies and Inconceivability 
 
Abstract 
One powerful argument for dualism is provided by David Chalmers: the ‘zombie’ 
or conceivability argument. This paper aims to establish that if one adopts the 
‘Powerful Qualities’ account of properties set forth by Martin and Heil, this 
argument can be resisted at the first premise: the claim that zombies are 
conceivable is, by the lights of Chalmers’ own account of conceivability, 
straightforwardly false. 
The Powerful Qualities account of properties is briefly outlined. Chalmers’ 
argument is set out, and several distinctions which underlie it explained. It is 
argued that to make sense of the claim that zombies are conceivable, some 
account of properties must be given. The paper’s central claim is presented and 
defended from potential responses: given the Powerful Qualities view, zombies 
are in fact inconceivable. Finally, an error theory is presented, motivated by this 
view, which offers an explanation of why so many have taken the conceivability of 
zombies to be unproblematic, and the view is briefly contrasted with Russellian 
Monism. 
 
I. Introduction 
In debates concerning the ontology of mind and body—concerning whether or 
not there is some ontological divide between the mental and the physical—it has 
long been claimed that, at the very least, one can conceive of such a divide. More 
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recently, David Chalmers has constructed a sophisticated argument which relies 
on this conceivability claim: the ‘zombie’ or conceivability argument. Roughly 
speaking, ‘zombies’ are creatures physically identical to human beings, but which 
lack certain aspects of the internal mental life that humans have. The argument 
proceeds by claiming first that zombies are conceivable; second, that on these 
grounds they are possible, and finally, that their possibility is incompatible with a 
monistic ontology of mind and body, such as physicalism. 
This paper aims to establish that, given a certain account of the ontology 
of properties (namely, the ‘Powerful Qualities’ account set forth by Charlie Martin 
and John Heil), the conceivability argument can be resisted at the first premise: 
the claim that zombies are conceivable is, by the lights of Chalmers’ own account 
of conceivability, straightforwardly false. It will not be the business of this paper 
to argue in favour of the Powerful Qualities view, but rather to examine what 
consequences follow for the conceivability argument if the view is accepted.  
The result established is significant in several respects. First, it may serve 
to make the Powerful Qualities view more attractive to those who support 
monistic ontologies, but are worried by the conceivability argument. Second, it 
ought to give pause to anyone who accepts both the Powerful Qualities account 
of properties and also the conceivability argument, who may have to give up one 
of these two positions in light of the arguments below. Third, it serves as a case 
study in support of a more general claim: that in order to proceed with debates in 
the philosophy of mind in a careful fashion, it is essential to get one’s ontology 
straight first.  
Section two outlines the Powerful Qualities account of properties, 
highlighting those features which are most pertinent to the current discussion. 
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Section three elaborates on several distinctions which underlie the conceivability 
argument, and then sets out what I hope is an accurate and charitable 
reconstruction of Chalmers’ conceivability argument. Section four argues that in 
order to make sense of the claim that zombies are conceivable, some explicit 
account of the ontology of properties must be given. Section five provides the 
argument for the central claim of this paper: that, contrary to what many have 
supposed, the claim that zombies are conceivable is false (at least given the 
Powerful Qualities account of properties). Section six examines some potential 
counter-responses to my argument, and also outlines an error theory, motivated 
by the Powerful Qualities view, which offers an explanation of why so many have 
taken the conceivability of zombies to be unproblematic. Section seven briefly 
contrasts the view with Russellian Monism. 
Alongside the extensive work that both Martin and Heil have published on 
the Powerful Qualities view, positions similar to it have become of increasing 
interest in recent years. For instance, such views have recently been defended by 
Jon Jacobs (2011); Kristina Engelhard (2010) and Galen Strawson (2008). Whilst 
Mumford and Anjum (2011) do not sign up wholly to the Powerful Qualities view, 
they have adopted certain aspects of Martin’s account. More generally, 
ontologies which take a realist view of causal powers, which is a key component 
of the Powerful Qualities view, are now commonplace (see, for instance, Bird 
2007; Shoemaker 2007; Molnar 2003). It is important, therefore, to explore how 
these developments in metaphysics bear on debates in related areas such as the 
philosophy of mind. This paper is one such exploration. 
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II. Powerful Qualities 
One of the key debates in the metaphysics of properties concerns whether 
properties are, fundamentally speaking, dispositional or 
categorical/qualitative/occurrent. Some philosophers argue that all real 
properties are causal powers or dispositions (e.g. Shoemaker 2007); or that all 
fundamental properties are dispositional—if there are any non-dispositional 
properties, they depend in some sense on the dispositional properties. Others, 
such as David Armstrong (e.g. 1997) have argued that all real properties are best 
characterised non-dispositionally (various terms have been used to denote non-
dispositionality, examples include 'categorical', 'occurrent' and 'qualitative'); or 
that all fundamental properties are of this sort—if there are any dispositional 
properties, they depend in some sense on categorical/qualitative/occurrent 
properties. There are also those who take a mixed view, holding that some real, 
fundamental properties are dispositional and other real, fundamental properties 
are categorical/qualitative/occurrent (e.g. Molnar 2003). 
These three approaches are not, however, exhaustive. A fourth position—
the 'Powerful Qualities' view, originally formulated by Martin, and developed by 
Heil—agrees in some sense with each of the above positions, whilst also 
disagreeing with each of them (see Martin 2008; Heil 2003; and Martin & Heil 
1998 and 1999). It is in agreement with the first view outlined above that there 
are no real, fundamental properties that fail to bestow upon their bearers certain 
dispositional features. And it agrees with the second view that there are no real, 
fundamental properties that fail to bestow upon their bearers certain non-
dispositional features. There is a sense, therefore, in which it agrees with the 
mixed view. However, contrary to the mixed view, the Powerful Qualities account 
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of properties holds that all real properties are both dispositional and (the 
preferred term of its proponents, and that which I shall use in this paper 
henceforth) qualitative. Thus, it is not that there are two (exclusive) classes of 
properties, the dispositional and the qualitative, which are co-fundamental, and 
exist alongside one another, as the mixed view holds. Nor, indeed, does the 
fundamentality of the dispositional properties threaten that of the qualitative 
properties (as the first view outlined above holds), nor vice versa (as the second 
view holds). Rather, according to the Powerful Qualities view, all real properties 
are best characterised as dispositional-cum-qualitative and qualitative-cum-
dispositional, with no priority afforded to either dispositionality or qualitativity. 
In Martin's later work (e.g. 2008), and the work of Heil (e.g. 2003), the 
notion that all real properties are both dispositional and qualitative is expressed in 
terms of a surprising identity: whilst, prima facie, it might appear that 
'dispositional' and 'qualitative' pick out heterogeneous property types, in fact the 
dispositional is identical with the qualitative. Every real property is unitary and 
simple, and makes both a contribution to the dispositional nature of the object 
that bears it (that is, informs how that object will behave in various 
circumstances) and makes a contribution to the qualitative nature of the object 
that bears it: “[t]hese cannot be prised apart into the purely qualitative and the 
purely dispositional” (Martin 1997: 216).  
Some critics have found such a characterisation of properties hard to 
conceive (see Armstrong 2005: 315 or Lowe 2006: 134), and certainly much could 
be said about how this surprising identity claim ought to be understood. However, 
this paper is not the place for such an exploration. Rather, the claim will be taken 
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at face value in order to examine what consequences follow for the conceivability 
argument if the position as stated is accepted. 
If this surprising identity claim is to be taken seriously, then some 
tempting misinterpretations of the position must be avoided. Chief amongst these 
would be interpreting the Powerful Qualities view as taking all real properties to 
be somehow composed of two distinct parts, one dispositional and the other 
qualitative. Nor should the view be taken as asserting that there is some sense in 
which, whilst all real properties are both dispositional and qualitative, there is 
some sense in which properties are really or more fundamentally one or the 
other. There is no priority in either direction: according to the Powerful Qualities 
view, the dispositional and the qualitative are co-eval and co-fundamental, 
because they are (surprising as this may be) one and the same thing—namely, the 
unitary, simple property itself. 
There is not space in this paper to argue in favour of the Powerful 
Qualities account of properties. The interested reader can find arguments in 
favour of the Powerful Qualities view in Martin (2008) and Heil (2003; 2012). Two 
points ought to be noted about the nature of the arguments that are put in favour 
of the view. First, these arguments are a priori. Second, such arguments only 
invoke premises which are independent of the issues in the philosophy of mind 
which are the focus of this paper, and so consequences which follow from the 
position should not be seen as begging any questions within the mind-body 
debate. 
Two further nuances of the Powerful Qualities account ought to be 
highlighted at this juncture, both concerning how that account conceives of 
dispositionality. First, on this view, the operation of dispositions is said to be 
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reciprocal and mutual (see Martin 2008: Chapter 5). That is to say, when some 
manifestation occurs it is never the work of a single disposition (perhaps having 
been set off by some ‘trigger’ event). Rather, every manifestation is brought 
about by the mutual and reciprocal action of (at the very least) two dispositions. 
Second, dispositions, according to the Powerful Qualities account, are, in the 
current technical jargon, massively multi-track. That is to say, each disposition 
disposes its bearer towards a huge variety of different manifestations with 
different reciprocal disposition partners. Thus, the very same disposition D0, when 
coupled with each of its possible “reciprocal disposition partners for mutual 
manifestations” (ibid.: 56) of the set {D1…Dn} will be directed towards a set of 
different manifestations {M1…Mn}. On the Powerful Qualities account, therefore, 
there is no sense in which one can talk of the (unique) manifestation which a 
particular disposition is disposed towards, or indeed, the (unique) disposition 
from which a particular manifestation springs. 
 
III. The Conceivability Argument 
The central premise of the conceivability argument may well find its origin in, and 
be most immediately recognisable from Descartes' claim that the mind and body 
can be conceived of as existing apart from one another (2008, Sixth Meditation). If 
they can be so conceived, then it is possible they could actually exist apart from 
one another, as for Descartes, whatever man can conceive, God can actualise 
(ibid.: 51). Any two things that can possibly exist apart cannot be identical, and so 
mind and body must be distinct. If the mind and body are distinct, then dualism is 
true. If dualism is true, then physicalism (and indeed any form of monism) is false. 
Chalmers has more recently developed and defended an argument that bears at 
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the very least a family resemblance to the Cartesian argument outlined above (for 
instance, 2010: Chapter 6).  
 Chalmers' conceivability argument is focussed on one aspect of mental 
phenomena: conscious or phenomenal experience. This sort of experience is that 
which it is like to undergo a particular mental process or to be in a particular 
mental state. Examples include: 
[...]the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality 
of depth in a visual field[...] the sound of a clarinet, the smell of 
mothballs[...] bodily sensations from pains to orgasms; mental images 
that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion[...] the 
experience of a stream of conscious thought.  (ibid.: 5) 
In motivating his argument, Chalmers asks us to consider creatures, known as 
zombies, who are physically identical to us but who lack all such experience (1996: 
94). Zombies, as far as appearances go, are exactly like us. However, for all the 
similarity of their bodily movements and vocalisations to ours, when a zombie 
peers out into the gradually darkening red-hued sunset; inhales the musty smell 
of her closet whilst strains of the next door neighbours' daughter's clarinet 
practice come screeching through the wall; when she cries out wildly due to the 
touch of a red hot poker, or that of her lover (and so on...), there is nothing that it 
is like to be her: none of this is accompanied by conscious experience.  
The zombie is able to react and respond to stimuli; to manipulate her 
environment; to regulate herself, just as we would in each of these situations—
but there is simply nothing it is like to do so. If zombies seems too far-fetched, 
Chalmers need not rely on full zombies for his version of the conceivability 
argument, but partial ones, who lack some particular phenomenal experiences 
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(2003: section 3.2), or what he calls inverts: creatures who do not lack any 
particular experiences, but rather experience differently than we do, perhaps they 
experience red when we experience green, and vice versa (ibid.). It is worth 
reiterating at this juncture that all these creatures (zombies, part-zombies and 
inverts) must be exact physical duplicates of subjects of conscious experience 
such as us. A red-green colour-blind person, for instance, is not an example of an 
invert, as a relevant physical difference (in the cones present in the eye) underlies 
and explains the difference in their visual experiences. Zombies may well inhabit 
zombie worlds; worlds that are complete physical duplicates of our own, but 
without any conscious experience. In such a world, for example, my zombie twin 
is currently sat typing about zombies, just as I am here (1996: 94–5), but there is 
nothing it is like for my zombie twin to do so.  
The first premise of Chalmers' conceivability argument is that zombies, 
part-zombies or inverts are conceivable.  
 
III.1 Some Preliminary Distinctions 
The conceivability argument involves a distinction between physicality 
and experience. When Chalmers discusses the physical, he means by this the 
fundamental entities and laws which figure in a complete account of microphysics 
(2010: 142), something he sees as inevitably "com[ing] down to two things: the 
structure and dynamics of physical processes" (1996: 118). So the claim that 
zombies (or part-zombies, or inverts) are conceivable is the claim that creatures  
identical to ourselves in terms of their microphysical composition, structure, 
dynamics and the microphysical laws which govern them, but which lack 
10 
 
experience entirely (or partially, or differ in the nature of their experience) are 
conceivable.  
Ideal, prima facie and secunda facie conceivability also need to be 
distinguished. Briefly, something is prima facie conceivable when, on first glance, 
it appears to be conceivable (to avoid circularity here, some criteria will need to 
be given for conceivability, more of which momentarily) (2010: 143–4). Something 
is secunda facie conceivable when it is prima facie conceivable and remains 
conceivable after some sustained rational scrutiny to ensure that it really does 
meet whatever criteria is being applied for conceivability (ibid.). Something is 
ideally conceivable when it remains conceivable given ideal rational reflection. 
Some might find the notion of ideal rational reflection inherently problematic. It is 
less than clear to me, for instance, what it would take for some act of rational 
reflection to be such. However, nothing I say in what follows will turn on this, so 
for the purposes of this paper I am happy to grant Chalmers the notion. He 
discusses some such problems, and tentatively indicates what an account of ideal 
conceivability might look like in (2002: 148). Chalmers claims that if something is 
secunda facie conceivable for us, then this is an excellent indication that it is 
ideally conceivable (ibid.: 197). For a full account of this distinction, and those that 
follow, see Chalmers (2002). 
Chalmers also distinguishes between positive and negative conceivability. 
Something is negatively conceivable when it is not ruled out a priori, that is, when 
it does not entail a contradiction (ibid.: 149). Contrastingly: 
Positive notions of conceivability require that one can form some sort of 
positive conception of a situation in which S is the case. One can place the 
varieties of positive conceivability under the broad rubric of imagination: 
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to positively conceive of a situation is to in some sense imagine a specific 
configuration of objects and properties. (ibid.: 150) 
It is unclear exactly how much philosophical weight positive conceivability can 
bear. However, the version of the conceivability argument examined in this paper 
invokes negative conceivability, so the difficult task of unravelling just what 
positive conceivability is, and what its philosophical consequences are, need not 
concern us here.  
The notion of negative conceivability provides a criterion by which to 
judge prima facie, secunda facie and ideal conceivability. Something is prima facie 
negatively conceivable if it does not entail a contradiction on first glance, secunda 
facie negatively conceivable if it does not do so following sustained rational 
scrutiny and ideally negatively conceivable if ideal rational reflection could not 
uncover a contradiction in what is being conceived. 
Chalmers defends the second premise of his conceivability argument (that 
conceivability leads to possibility) through an appeal to a further distinction: that 
between primary and secondary conceivability. However, as I do not challenge his 
argument by attacking the second premise, I shall not discuss it here: for 
Chalmers' account see (1996: Chapter 2), or, for a full discussion of both the 
foundations and applications of this distinction see Garcia-Carpintero, M. & J. 
Macia eds (2006). 
Various combinations of prima facie/secunda facie/ideal; 
positive/negative and primary/secondary conceivability allow for twelve different 
formulations of conceivability. Most of these receive some treatment in Chalmers 
(1996). The discussion in this paper is not sensitive to the primary/secondary 
distinction, and will not be concerned with the (somewhat nebulous) notion of 
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positive conceivability. Intellectual honesty and philosophical prudence dictates 
that whilst we must begin pre-theoretically with prima facie conceivability, we 
ought always to pass over it in favour of secunda facie conceivability: if we want 
to put any weight on what at first glance appears conceivable, it is incumbent on 
us to subject this appearance to sustained rational scrutiny. This leaves on the 
table secunda facie negative conceivability and ideal negative conceivability. The 
former is considered by Chalmers to be a very good guide to the latter, and the 
version of Chalmers' argument critiqued here relies on the latter.  
 
III.2 Chalmers' Conceivability Argument  
The version of Chalmers' argument presented below is reconstructed from several 
different iterations presented in Chapter 6 of (2010). I omit those parts of the 
argument not pertinent to the discussion at hand, and where he has used some 
symbolic shorthand, I have written out the argument fully. Despite these changes 
in presentation, and certain omissions, I hope I have presented Chalmers' 
argument accurately and charitably. The argument runs as follows: 
(P1) It is ideally negatively conceivable that a world which is an exact 
physical duplicate of our world differs from our world in terms of the 
conscious experiences that occur there; 
(P2) If it is ideally negatively conceivable that a world which is an exact 
physical duplicate of our world differs from our world in terms of the 
conscious experiences that occur there, then it is possible that a world 
which is an exact physical duplicate of our world differs from our world in 
terms of the conscious experiences that occur there; 
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(P3) If it is possible that a world which is an exact physical duplicate of our 
world differs from our world in terms of the conscious experiences that 
occur there, then physicalism is false; 
(C1) Physicalism is false. 
Premise one claims that a conceiver possessed of all relevant information and 
engaged in ideal rational reflection on the subject could derive no contradiction 
from, or could not rule out a priori, the notion of a world which is an exact 
physical duplicate of our world at which nothing undergoes conscious experience 
(a zombie world); or one at which some of the physical duplicates of our-worldly 
subjects-of-experience undergo less conscious experience than their our-worldly 
counterparts (a partial zombie world), or one at which some of these duplicate 
entities undergo different conscious experiences (an invert world). Premise two 
affirms the link between ideal negative conceivability and possibility. Premise 
three claims that such a possibility is incompatible with a physicalist account of 
the ontology of mind and body. The conclusion ought to be clear.  
 
IV. Duplication and Properties 
Chalmers’ first premise, the claim that a zombie world is ideally negatively 
conceivable, is the target of the response developed below. To appreciate the 
force of this response, we need to take a closer look at (P1), and consider exactly 
what it is that we are being asked to accept as conceivable. That (P1) is open to 
examination is a point often (although not always, see, for instance, Worley 
(2003) or Van Gulick (1999)) missed. In his discussion of the argument, Tim Crane 
states 'Premise (1) is also fairly uncontroversial [...] all [it] requires is that one can 
conceive of a physical replica of any phenomenally conscious creature which lacks 
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[such consciousness]. This is clearly conceivable.' (2001: 100). Before assenting to 
Crane’s assessment, we should be clear on both what it means for some world to 
be an exact physical duplicate of our own, and what it would take for such a world 
to differ in terms of the conscious experiences that occur there. Only then will the 
conceivability of zombies acquire the 'clarity' attributed to it by Crane.  
  
IV.1 What is physical duplication? 
This question is ontological in nature: it concerns what sorts of entities (in the 
broadest sense) there are in both our own world and the putative zombie world.  
What it would take for some world to be a physical duplicate of this world 
then includes, but may not be limited to: 
1. it containing duplicates of all the physical objects found in this 
world; 
2. these objects being arranged in the same manner; 
3. these objects having the same physical histories (past 
arrangements); 
4. these objects being subject to the same physical laws. 
Condition 1 requires some further specification. Duplication, conceptually 
speaking, involves similarity; perfect duplication, exact similarity. Properties are 
what characterise objects, and as such, they provide the dimensions along which 
objects can be similar or dissimilar. For an object O1 to be a duplicate of another 
object O2 (physical or otherwise) it would need (at least) to instantiate exactly 
similar properties in an exactly similar pattern, both synchronically and 
diachronically; it would seem perverse to insist that O1 is a physical duplicate of O2 
if these two instantiate dissimilar physical properties. For two things to fail to be 
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mental duplicates would be for there to be a dissimilarity in the mental properties 
they instantiate or the pattern (both synchronic and diachronic) in which they are 
instantiated. It seem then, that regardless of the general account of ontology the 
proponent of the conceivability argument puts forward, they are going to have to 
provide some account of properties (whether their fundamental entities are 
objects, facts, states of affairs or whatever...) in order for the notion of duplication 
to play the required role in the argument.  
 Of course, had one the relevant technical expertise, one could duplicate 
something without settling on an account of properties (just as one could perform 
sums without a rich conception of numbers). But without such an account, one 
cannot (in the relevant sense) conceive of duplication per se, and so, a fortiori, not 
of physical duplication without a duplication of conscious experience—and the 
conceivability argument requires that one cannot uncover a contradiction a priori 
in this (just as, without some more developed account of number, one could not 
reliably decide whether it is conceivable or not that the sum of two evens be odd). 
Without a positive conception of the relevant notions one cannot, with 
confidence, endorse the claim that no such contradiction can be found: the 
demands of sustained rational scrutiny which amount to secunda facie 
conceivability require that an account be given. As will be seen below, it is the 
account of properties outlined in section two that will be operative in the 
response to the conceivability argument, and if the above is correct, any 
proponent of this argument will have to have some such account. 
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IV.2 The physical/conscious distinction 
For something to be a physical duplicate is for it to instantiate exactly similar 
physical properties; for Chalmers this means for it to instantiate exactly similar 
structural and dynamic properties at the microphysical level. Structural and 
dynamic properties, at first glance, seem like ideal candidates for characterisation 
in purely dispositional terms. These are to be contrasted, remember, with 
conscious experiences; things which Chalmers regularly characterises with the 
term 'quality'. Conscious experiences of the sort relevant to the current 
discussion, at first glance, seem like ideal candidates for characterisation in purely 
qualitative terms. If this is correct, then (P1) asserts the conceivability of a world 
which is an exact dispositional duplicate of our world, but which differs with 
regard to its qualitative nature; that is, that the preceding notion cannot be ruled 
out a priori, that it does not entail any contradiction.  
 There are other ways that this distinction can be drawn, but for the 
purposes of this paper we shall accept the manner set out above. As this is 
Chalmers’ own way of drawing the distinction (other prominent proponents of 
arguments in favour of dualism also draw the distinction in this way, e.g. Jackson 
1982; and both Blackburn 1990 and Hawthorne 2001 have argued that what 
physical science does is track dispositionality), it seems justified to adopt it here. 
 
V. Responding to the Conceivability Argument 
There are a number of ways one might respond to Chalmers' argument. The 
argument appears to be valid, so any response will question the soundness of the 
argument. (P3) ought to be relatively uncontroversial. Thus, responses to the 
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argument will target the viability of the conceivability claim, (P1), and/or the link 
between conceivability and possibility, (P2).  
 One fairly common response (e.g. Hill and McLaughlin 1999) is to deny the 
truth of (P2), that is, to deny that ideal negative conceivability entails possibility. If 
conceivability does not entail possibility, that is, if some things which are not ruled 
out a priori by acts of ideal rational reflection are nonetheless impossible, then 
Chalmers' argument does not go through. Chalmers discusses a number of ways 
this attack might be elaborated in (2002), and provides a response in (2010: 
section 3.6). The debate surrounding this question is complex, and Chalmers' 
response is subtle and nuanced. For the sake of this paper, I am willing to grant 
the truth of (P2), that is, to accept the link between ideal negative conceivability 
and possibility. 
Another possible response is to question whether there is any good reason to 
accept (P1)—to accept the claim that zombie world are ideally negatively 
conceivable. This amounts to denying Chalmers' claim that secunda facie negative 
conceivability is an excellent guide to ideal negative conceivability (2002: 197). For 
the purposes of what follows, however, I am willing to grant the link between 
secunda facie and ideal negative conceivability. The response given below is 
stronger than that just outlined, as it claims not that we lack a reason to assert 
(P1), but that we have a reason to deny it. 
 
V.1 (P1) is false 
That Chalmers' notions of physical phenomena and conscious experiences seem 
apt to be characterised in purely dispositional and purely qualitative terms, 
respectively, gives us reason to doubt (according to the account of properties put 
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forward in this paper) that what they pick out are properties. A proponent of the 
Powerful Qualities account of properties does not need to hold that these 
descriptions are erroneous. Rather, any inference from the aptness of such 
descriptions to the claim that there are therefore pure dispositions or pure 
qualities is erroneous. Objects can be described in purely dispositional terms, just 
regarding how they will behave in a variety of situations; and likewise they can be 
characterised in purely qualitative terms, regardless of their potential behaviours. 
But neither of these characterisations is exhaustive, for the properties which, in 
complex combinations, are the truthmakers for these purely dispositional or 
purely qualitative descriptions are themselves purely neither, and impurely both. 
For a proponent of the Powerful Qualities account, dispositions and qualities are 
identical.  
If duplication is a matter of the instantiation of exactly similar properties, 
and if the notions of the physical and the consciously experiential in play in 
Chalmers' argument do not pick out properties, then the question surrounding 
the conceivability of a physical-but-not-consciously-experiencing-duplicate is less 
clear cut than it might at first have appeared to be, for we cannot 
straightforwardly identify some set of purely physical (purely dispositional) 
properties which are instantiated by both objects in the duplication-pair, and 
some set of purely consciously experiential (purely qualitative) properties which 
are instantiated by only one of the objects in the duplication-pair. 
 The proponent of the conceivability argument, in asserting (P1), holds 
that no contradiction can be derived from the claim that a world alike in all its 
dispositional features to our own (a physical duplicate of our world) could differ in 
at least some of its qualitative features (not a duplicate of our world in terms of 
the conscious experiences that occur there). But according to the Powerful 
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Qualities account of properties, dispositional and qualitative features are 
bestowed in virtue of properties in complex combinations, each of which makes 
specific contributions to both the overall dispositionality and overall qualitativity 
of the objects that instantiate them. The notion of an exact physical duplicate 
which is not a duplicate in terms of conscious experience fails to respect the 
identity claim central to this account. All real property instances make some 
particular dispositional contribution, D, to the object O1 that instantiates them if 
and only if they also make some particular qualitative contribution, Q. But (P1) 
asserts that it is conceivable that some object O2 instantiates at least one property 
that makes an exactly similar dispositional contribution as it does to O1, but not an 
exactly similar qualitative one, that is, that it is conceivable that some property 
could make dispositional contribution D without making qualitative contribution 
Q. This straightforwardly contradicts the bi-conditional assertion made by the 
Powerful Qualities account.  
 Given the Powerful Qualities account of properties and the account of 
duplication argued for in section four, a contradiction can be derived a priori from 
the notion of zombies (etc.). This contradiction, whilst not necessarily 
immediately apparent, can be uncovered after some sustained rational scrutiny. 
That is to say, zombies (etc.) are not secunda facie negatively conceivable, and so, 
a fortiori, not ideally negatively conceivable. Thus, (P1) is false.  
Whilst it has been said above that conscious phenomenal experience is 
apt to be characterised in purely qualitative terms, that is, that the phenomenal is 
to be accounted for in terms of the qualitative; this should not be taken to entail 
the claim that all qualitative features of things are conscious phenomenal 
experiences. According to the Powerful Qualities account, all real properties 
bestow some qualitative nature on the objects that instantiate them. But this is 
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not to endorse panpsychicism, which says that everything undergoes conscious 
experience. Rather, phenomenal features are a sub-class of qualitative features. 
Thus, if the Powerful Qualities account is correct, the properties, whatever they 
may be, that account for a particular phenomenal experience, will bestow both 
some dispositional (some causal, dynamic, structural) and some qualitative nature 
on their bearer. But not everything which, by virtue of the properties it 
instantiates, has both some dispositional and some qualitative nature will 
undergo conscious phenomenal experience.  
This characterisation of the phenomenal in terms of the qualitative (as 
opposed to the dispositional), seems to be something that Chalmers should 
accept. For if the phenomenal is accounted for dispositionally, then it is hard to 
see how his famous ‘hard problem’ would be motivated—there is nothing prima 
facie mysterious about the relationship between two dispositional (causal, 
structural, dynamic) features of a system. (See, for instance, Chalmers’ discussion 
of hard and easy problems of consciousness in 1995). It is the intrinsic, occurrent 
features of phenomenal experience that are supposed to motivate the hard 
problem—features which are to be accounted for in terms of qualitativity. 
The Powerful Qualities account of properties gives one the tools to make 
a principled denial of the first premise of the conceivability argument. 
Furthermore, the account is motivated by a priori considerations which are 
independent of the issues in the philosophy of mind which are at stake in this 
debate, and so cannot be accused of simply begging the question in favour of the 
inconceivability of zombies. 
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V.2 Zombies are impossible? 
 I am not the only person to have appealed to the Powerful Qualities 
account of properties in order to respond to the conceivability argument. Heil 
highlights the inconsistency between this view of properties and the possibility of 
zombies, stating 'Qualities and powers cannot vary independently. The possibility 
of zombies depends on the denial of this thesis', (2003: 248; see also Heil & Robb 
2003: 189). His attack on the argument focuses on the possibility, rather than the 
conceivability, of zombies. I have opted to aim at the latter, in order to fend off a 
potential response from the proponent of the argument. It might be held that if 
our modal epistemology comes into conflict with certain claims made by our 
ontology, then this highlights some problem with the ontology outlined. 
Proponents of the conceivability argument take secunda facie negative 
conceivability to be an excellent guide to ideal negative conceivability, which in 
turn is seen as a perfect guide to possibility. They might hold, therefore, that if a 
certain ontological position comes into conflict with what they take to be possible 
(via conceivability), this is simply evidence against that position. The strongest line 
of attack is to show that first, for the conceivability claim to even get off the 
ground, some ontological account of properties or other must be given, and 
second, given a certain account—the Powerful Qualities account—the 
conceivability claim itself cannot be maintained. 
  I have shown that, given that the proponent of the conceivability 
argument must inevitably settle on some substantive account of properties, the 
notion of zombies may entail a contradiction a priori; rendering them 
inconceivable according to Chalmers' account of conceivability. Given this, 
questions concerning the relative status of conceivability and ontology with 
regards to our modal epistemology dissolve: the former is inextricably tied to the 
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latter, and it is no longer open to the proponent of this argument to claim that the 
clash between the Powerful Qualities account and the possibility of zombies 
highlights a defect with that ontology. Of course, the proponent of the 
conceivability argument may wish to deny the Powerful Qualities account 
altogether, but she cannot do that on the grounds that it clashes with the 
conceivability of zombies, on pain of begging the question. She will need both an 
alternative account of properties, and independent motivation for adopting that 
account rather than this one.  
 
VI. Counter-Responses 
VI.1 Modal variation of what a property contributes 
A proponent of the conceivability argument might respond to the claims made 
above that even if one accepts that every real property makes both a dispositional 
and a qualitative contribution to whatever bears it, these contributions could 
come apart modally; that is, that the same property that makes contributions D1 
and Q1 at this world might make entirely different contributions—D2 and Q2, say—
or partially different contributions—D1 and Q2, say—at some other world.  
One needs to be clear on what would need to be the case in order for 
these to represent genuine possibilities. The first case, where the same property 
makes completely different contributions in a different possible world, requires 
that we have a very peculiar account of property similarity. The natural way to 
consider two properties as the same (or, for a trope theorist, as members of the 
same exact resemblance class) would be in terms of those properties making 
exactly similar contributions to the objects that bear them. If we give up on this 
way of grouping properties as the same, we will need some other principle, by 
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which to do so. The only option seems to be a quidditism according to which the 
identity of properties is trivial and brute (see Bird 2007: 44 f.38). Such a 
conception, however, will not help the proponent of the conceivability argument. 
If we are to accept that two objects located at different worlds are duplicates of 
one another in virtue of bearing certain properties that can be considered the 
'same', but which make wholly dissimilar contributions to those objects, we seem 
to have given up on any notion of duplication which is of philosophical interest. It 
is also hard to see what would license, as the proponent of the argument would 
require, us considering such objects as specifically physical duplicates and 
specifically not duplicates in terms of conscious experience. 
 Perhaps, as in the second case above, the same physical properties 
(properties considered in terms of their dispositional contribution) could 
contribute in distinctive ways in terms of qualitativity at different worlds. If one 
accepts the Powerful Qualities account, zombie worlds will not be conceivable, as 
these properties will always make some qualitative contribution. Invert worlds, 
however, will be conceivable (worlds which are physical duplicates but at which 
some conscious experiences are different rather than absent). Chalmers' takes the 
possibility of invert worlds to be enough to establish his dualist conclusion (1996: 
99–101). Thus, if my response allows for inverts, it is of little relevance to the 
mind-body debate. One might consider it possible for properties that make an 
exactly similar dispositional contribution to their bearers to make dissimilar 
qualitative contributions if one does not take the identity claim of the Powerful 
Qualities account seriously; instead considering properties as somehow ‘made up’ 
of a dispositional and a qualitative ‘bit’ which could be freely recombined. 
However, for the purposes of this paper, we are examining what follows for the 
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conceivability argument if the Powerful Qualities account is correct—and this 
includes taking the identity claim seriously.  
 Another reason one might take the notion that the dispositional and 
qualitative contributions made by a property can vary independently of one 
another to be plausible is if one thought something like the following: properties 
are really qualities, but they all also make a dispositional contribution to whatever 
bears them in virtue of the laws of nature that hold at the world in which they are 
instantiated. Thus, in different worlds with different laws, two distinct qualities Q1 
and Q2 could make the same dispositional contributions/play the same 
dispositional role. However, this manner of characterising the situation is of little 
use as a response to the challenge to the conceivability argument laid out above, 
as it fails to properly understand the Powerful Qualities account: there is no 
direction in which properties are really either qualitative or dispositional, and only 
circumstantially or contingently the other.  
 
VI.2 A posteriori necessity 
At least one supporter of Powerful Qualities, Jacobs (2011: 89–90), interprets the 
identity claim as being one of a posteriori necessity. Chalmers' discusses how a 
posteriori necessities might bear on his account extensively, and provides 
convincing arguments, utilising the resources of two-dimensional semantics, to 
show that an appeal to this class of identities do not pose a challenge to his 
argument (for instance, 2010, section 3.6). Briefly put, the idea is that if the 
identity between the physical (dispositional) and conscious experience (qualities) 
is an a posteriori one, then whilst strictly speaking these two could not vary 
independently, we must allow for a variation analogous to that between water 
25 
 
being identical with H2O and watery-stuff being identical with XYZ on Twin Earth. 
If this is granted, Chalmers' is able to exploit a peculiar feature of qualities: whilst 
we might maintain a genuine distinction between water and watery-stuff, it is 
plausible that no such distinction can be maintained between some quality Q and 
Q-y-stuff. Given this, the same quality can play different dispositional roles in 
different worlds, and qualities and dispositions can vary independently of one 
another: the conceivability of zombies (or at least inverts) is back on the table.  
 This, however, is not the correct manner in which to characterise the 
identity claim as conceived by the main proponents of the Powerful Qualities 
account of properties. Heil, for instance, makes it abundantly clear that the force 
of the identity claim is such that the dispositional and the qualitative cannot, in 
the strongest of senses, vary independently of one another (2012: section 4.12). 
The identity between the qualitative and the dispositional is not like that of water 
and H2O; an imprecise pre-scientific conception of a substance being coupled with 
precise scientific account of the substance's internal constitution. Rather, the 
reasoning in favour of the identity claim is a priori in nature, and concerns the 
nature of a certain fundamental ontological category: properties. We may not 
know a priori the particular identities which obtain between specific dispositions 
and qualities, such information being only attainable a posteriori and in a 
falsifiable form. This, however, does not count against the arguments given in this 
paper: for if the Powerful Qualities view as elaborated by Martin and Heil is 
correct, what we do know a priori is that for a given disposition D1, first, it will be 
identical with some quality or other Qn; and second, for any specific quality Q1, if it 
is in fact the case that D1=Q1 at this world, this identity will hold at all worlds. This 
reasoning can be run in either direction—nothing of philosophical significance 
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should be inferred from the fact that we started by considering a given disposition 
as opposed to a quality. 
  
VI.3 The Apparent Conceivability of Zombies 
Notwithstanding the arguments given above, some may hold that zombies, part-
zombies and inverts ought to be conceivable. If this normative intuition is strong 
enough, it may lead one to conclude that there must, therefore, be something 
wrong with an account of properties (such as the Powerful Qualities account) 
which rules out zombies (etc.) a priori. If anything ought to be conceded to this 
response, it is that there does not seem to be anything immediately difficult about 
‘forming a picture’ in one's mind of zombies (etc.). Doing this might be taken by 
some to be 'conceiving'. The challenge is to plausibly accommodate this intuition, 
or, to put it another way, to provide an error theory for the conceivability 
argument. If this can be done, then the force this response has will be dispelled, 
and it poses little problem for the challenge levelled at the conceivability 
argument in section V.1.  
 It is important to be clear about what needs to be accommodated here: 
the possibility of something that looks exactly like a human, engages in all sorts of 
human-like behavioural activities, but which differs with regard to conscious 
experience. Such an entity, it must be recognised, does not automatically meet 
the requirements of the first premise of the conceivability argument: it is a further 
step to assert that this entity is a physical duplicate of a human being. The 
Powerful Qualities account can accommodate the intuition in favour of the 
conceivability of this sort of entity. Remember that on this account dispositions 
are multi-track: the having of a certain property disposes the bearer to behave in 
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a huge variety of ways with a huge variety of different reciprocal disposition 
partners. Given this, certain properties will share some of what they dispose their 
bearers to do; although no dissimilar properties will dispose bearers in exactly the 
same way. These properties which share some of the dispositional contribution 
they make to their bearers will nonetheless differ in terms of the qualitative 
contribution they make. It seems to me that there could be two objects that were 
propertied such that they had substantial dispositional overlap with regards to all 
the reciprocal disposition partners one would normally expect them to come into 
contact with, but which diverged radically with regards to atypical partners.  
One could represent this as in Fig. 1 below, where two objects’—O1 and 
O2—dispositional profiles are represented as two triangles, each point inside the 
triangle representing the manner in which the object would manifest were it to 
interact with some reciprocal disposition partner On. Where the triangles overlap, 
the objects O1 and O2 would manifest in just the same way given interaction with 
the same partner On. Where they do not, they would manifest differently. 
Suppose that all the sorts of partners we would expect either O1 or O2 to 
encounter fall within the shaded zone: that is, suppose that, in all the situations 
we would expect them to find themselves, they behave just the same. The 
partners that lie in the white zones are highly atypical for both O1 and O2, but it is 
only through interaction with such partners that the (dispositional, and thus, 
physical) differences between O1 and O2 could be uncovered. Objects such as 
these look like they would satisfy the intuition that a positive conception of 
dispositionally identical but qualitatively distinct objects can be coherently 
formed. 
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O1 and O2 would not however be dispositional (and therefore physical) 
duplicates of one another; they would simply appear as such when considered in a 
limited sense, or in a sufficiently coarse grained manner. The genuine possibility 
of these sorts of entities, whilst they do not support (P1), ought to satisfy the 
intuition that we can conceive of something that looks exactly like a human, 
engages in all sorts of human-like behavioural activities, but which differs with 
regard to conscious experience (Stoljar 2007 makes a similar argument, albeit 
differently supported, appealing to apparent conceivings of zombies). That we can 
comfortably form a picture of such an entity in our mind—and indeed the genuine 
metaphysical possibility of such an entity—has no bearing on the truth or falsity of 
(P1), for whilst such things are similar in various ways to human beings, they are 
most certainly not duplicates of them in the relevant sense.  
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VI.4 Physical Powerful Qualities, Mental Powerful Qualities
1
 
Consider the following account of the ontology of mind and body: any instance of 
phenomenal experience is to be accounted for in terms of the subject who 
undergoes it instantiating some phenomenal property (which contributes to both 
the qualitative and the dispositional nature of its bearer) and some distinct but 
correlated neural property (which also contributes to both the qualitative and the 
dispositional nature of its bearer). Both of these properties are powerful qualities, 
but they are distinct, although it may be nomologically necessary that they are 
always co-instantiated in our world. Given that these properties are distinct, and 
only linked by nomological necessity, then it is metaphysically possible that at 
some world with different laws, there could be a creature which instantiates the 
neural property but not the phenomenal one: that is, there could be a zombie, 
part-zombie or invert. 
 The picture sketched above allows both that all real properties are 
powerful qualities and that zombies (etc.) are possible. As such, it might be 
thought to represent a serious challenge to the central claim of this paper: that 
the conceivability of zombies is threatened by the Powerful Qualities account of 
properties.  
 This response involves giving up on the idea that the distinction between 
the physical and the mental is to be drawn in terms of dispositionality and 
qualitativity. Given that this is the manner in which Chalmers draws the 
distinction when motivating the conceivability argument (see section IV.2), in 
order to make use of this response some amendment to the argument will have 
to be made: a different and principled way to draw the distinction will have to be 
                                                          
1
 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing the importance of this line of 
response. 
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provided. In doing so, it must not be specified (as it is in the brief sketch above) 
that experiential and non-experiential properties are really distinct: for this is the 
conclusion of the conceivability argument, and so on pain of begging the question 
must not be required in order to secure the premises.  So, at the very least, if the 
argument put forward in this paper is correct, then there is work to be done by 
the proponent of the conceivability argument (if the Powerful Qualities account of 
properties is correct). 
 There is not the space in this paper to engage in a detailed examination of 
the debate concerning the drawing of the physical/mental distinction. However, a 
couple of points should be noted. First, as discussed in section V.1, drawing the 
distinction in terms of dispositionality and qualitativity plays a key role in 
motivating the Hard Problem, and so might not be so easily given up. Second, so 
long as (contra the Powerful Qualities account) ‘disposition’ and ‘quality’ are 
taken to pick out heterogeneous property kinds, drawing the distinction in this 
manner is felicitous for the conceivability claim—other ways of drawing the 
distinction may not be.  
 Furthermore, adopting this response leads to an arguably untenable (or at 
least highly unappealing) view of the relationship between the experiential and 
the physical. This is because it entails that it cannot be the case that our 
experiences are produced by our bodies and their interactions with our 
environment. According to realist views of causal powers, such as the Powerful 
Qualities account, production is a matter of the manifestation of dispositions. So, 
if our experiences are the manifestation our physical dispositions in interaction 
with the powers of items in their environment, then any physical duplicate of a 
human placed in identical circumstances should produce just the same 
manifestations as the human. Ex hypothesi, for the proponent of this response, 
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the zombie duplicate lacks the experiences, but if what I have said is correct, 
produces the same manifestations. Thus, according to the account on which this 
response rests, our experiences cannot be produced by our bodies interacting 
with their environment. 
 
VII. Russellian Monism 
Russellian Monism is an account of the ontology of mind and body committed to 
three central claims:  
5. That there are two fundamental property types: irreducible intrinsic 
qualities on the one hand, and structural properties that obtain between 
these on the other.  
6. That the intrinsic qualities are responsible for phenomenal consciousness. 
7. That only the structural properties are amenable to scientific 
investigation. 
Russellian Monism is not ruled out by the conceivability argument, and if one 
specifies that the intrinsic qualities are physical properties, then it may count as a 
form of physicalism. However, Chalmers states that '…because [Russellian 
Monism] relies on speculation about the special nature of the fundamental 
properties in microphysics, it is a highly distinctive form of physicalism that has 
much in common with property dualism and that many physicalists will want to 
reject', (2010: 152). Rusellian Monism, just like property dualism, involves 
invoking a fundamental distinction in property types (claim 5). Furthermore, it 
entails that those properties, physical or no, that are responsible for phenomenal 
consciousness remain inaccessible to science (claims 6 and 7). 
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It might be asked if the same issues arise for an account of the ontology of 
mind and body which takes all fundamental properties to be powerful qualities. If 
they do, then this view will be no more attractive to physicalisitically minded 
monists than Russellian Monism, a position which Chalmers has already 
conceded. The same issues do not arise, however. First, the view outlined in this 
paper does not endorse a distinction of fundamental property types, and so is not 
structurally similar to property dualism in the way Russellian Monism is. Nor does 
the view suffer from the worry that some large class of the real properties are 
beyond the reach of the sciences; for if, as has been suggested, science tracks the 
dispositional natures of things, and, as the Powerful Qualities account holds, all 
properties contribute to the dispositions of the objects that instantiate them, then 
all real properties are amenable to scientific enquiry. Even if it were to be the case 
on the Powerful Qualities view that science does not reveal the qualitative 
contribution made by properties (whether or not this is the case is a tricky 
question, one which would require much more attention than can be given here), 
the view would still have an advantage over Russellian Monism. Whilst on the 
latter view, a whole class of properties remain entirely inaccessible, on the 
former, all properties fall within the purview of science, although science may not 
be able to characterise properties exhaustively. 
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I have argued that in order for (P1) to be intelligible, some 
substantive account of properties needs to be given, for in the absence of such an 
account, we cannot make sense of the notion of duplication. I have tried to be as 
charitable to this argument as possible, accepting its account of conceivability, 
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and the (not uncontroversial) claim that from this sort of conceivability one can 
draw substantive conclusions about possibility. I have demonstrated that 
accepting the Powerful Qualities account of properties renders (P1) false. Making 
explicit what it would take for there to be zombies, part-zombies or inverts—that 
is, the independent variation of the dispositional and qualitative contributions 
made by exactly similar properties—uncovers a contradiction which hitherto lay 
unnoticed. Zombies, part-zombies and inverts are shown, by the lights of the 
Powerful Qualities account, to be secunda facie negatively inconceivable, and thus 
we have no reason to deny that they are ideally negatively conceivable, that is, to 
deny (P1). I have responded to a number of objections that might be raised 
against my challenge to the conceivability argument, and have attempted to 
dispel any lingering intuition that might remain that somehow zombies, part-
zombies and inverts ought to be conceivable. 
Exactly what lesson will be taken from this will vary depending on what 
prior commitments and philosophical objectives one has. Doubtless a staunch 
adherent to the conceivability argument will take it to suggest that there must be 
something wrong with the Powerful Qualities account—but it is then incumbent 
on them to provide some suitable alternative to this account, and to establish that 
by its lights, zombies are conceivable. Those who wish to resist the conclusions of 
the conceivability argument, conversely, may take this to result to increase the 
attractiveness of the Powerful Qualities account. If nothing else, I hope that the 
arguments put forward in this paper show that, in order to make headway on 
certain difficult questions in the philosophy of mind, it is essential to proceed in a 
spirit of both ontological seriousness and candour. 
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